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ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS:
INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION OR ENDLESS LITIGATION?
I. Introduction
On January 1, 1970, Congress enacted the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA)'. NEPA's purpose is to "declare a national policy
which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between
man and his environment."' 2 In an effort to achieve this national
policy, NEPA requires that federal agencies proposing "major Federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" 3
include in their proposals or recommendations an Environmental Im-
pact Statement (EIS). 4 The EIS must include both an assessment of
the beneficial and adverse environmental impacts of the proposed
action and an analysis of the impacts in light of other circumstances.
5
By requiring agencies to file an EIS, Congress sought to insure that
agencies consider fully all environmental effects of proposals for major
federal action. 6
Encompassing nearly every action that will affect the environment,
even if the effect is not significant enough to require an EIS, 7 NEPA
has given rise to litigation in a variety of contexts. Cases concerning
highway proposals,8 housing projects, 9 dams and waterways, 0 and
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976).
2. Id. § 4321. In addition, NEPA's purpose is to "promote efforts which [would]
prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the
health and welfare of man." Id.
3. Id. § 4332(2)(C).
4. Id.
5. Id. The impacts should be analyzed in light of the probabilities or possibili-
ties of environmental damage. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 685 F.2d 459, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(relevant factors to be considered were environmental risks, health, socioeconomic
and cumulative effects). Other relevant circumstances include long-term benefits of
the project, commitments of resources and alternatives to the project. 42 U.S.C. §
4332(c).
6. 115 CONG. REC. 14,347 (1969) (statement of Sen. Jackson). A major federal
action is one which, for example, has a nationwide effect, receives federal funding or
involves federal agencies. See notes 46-73 infra and accompanying text.
7. See notes 50-93 infra and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (injunction of
Darien Gap Highway construction vacated upon a finding that EIS not deficient);
Citizens Comm. against Interstate Route 675 v. Lewis, 542 F. Supp. 496 (S.D. Ohio
1982) (injunction of highway construction project denied upon a finding that final
EIS was adequate); Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 541 F. Supp.
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mineral, oil and gas drilling" have involved NEPA considerations.
Other environmental litigation has involved nuclear armament stor-
age, 2 nuclear energy plants 3 and endangerment of wildlife.1
4
The requirements for preparing and filing an EIS have been the
subject of considerable controversy.' 5 Regulations enacted by the
1367 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("Westway II") (construction of proposed highway project
enjoined on grounds of EIS inadequacy).
9. See, e.g., Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223
(1980) (EIS prepared for low-income housing project found not violative of NEPA);
Richland Park Homeowners Ass'n v. Pierce, 671 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1982) (injunctive
relief denied to Texas homeowners seeking to enjoin federal subsidization of low-
income families residing in already constructed middle and low-income housing
development).
10. See, e.g., Izaak Walton League of America v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (Army Corps of Engineers ordered to hold public meeting concerning EIS
for proposed lock and dam in upper Mississippi River Navigation System); Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983 (5th Cir. 1981) (Army Corps of
Engineers ordered to prepare supplemental EIS for construction of Tennessee-Tom-
bigbee Waterway); Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 621 F.2d 1017 (9th
Cir. 1980). In Warm Springs, the court denied an injunction against further con-
struction of the Warm Springs Dam Project even after a new geological study
revealed the possibility of earthquakes of greater magnitude than the Corps had
taken into account in the original EIS. The court found that the Corps had studied
the problem thoroughly and had "reasonably concluded that no substantial adverse
environmental effects were presented." Id. at 1027.
11. See, e.g., Cabinet Mountains Wilderness/Scotchman's Peak Grizzly Bears v.
Peterson, 685 F.2d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (U.S. Forest Service approval of plan for
exploratory mineral drilling in Cabinet Mountains Wilderness Area upheld on
grounds that the agency's decision not to file an EIS was not arbitrary and capri-
cious); California v. Watt, 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982) (Department of Interior
had not violated NEPA by failing to supplement EIS during offering for competitive
bidding for oil and gas lease contracts located in Santa Maria Basin).
12. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Educ. Project, 454
U.S. 139 (1981) (Navy's decision not to prepare "hypothetical EIS" for operation of
nuclear weapon storage facility not unreasonable because under Freedom of Infor-
mation Act, Navy not required to release such information to the public).
13. See, e.g., People Against Nuclear Energy v. United States Nuclear Regula-
tor), Comm'n, 678 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (significant changes in psychological
health effects resulting from continued operation of Three Mile Island nuclear facil-
ity after nuclear accident need not be revealed in supplemental EIS), rev'd sub nom.
Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 51 U.S.L.W* 4371 (U.S.
Apr. 19, 1983); Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor,
619 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1980) (Nuclear Regulatory Commission required to prepare
EIS for project to dispose of radioactive waste water from Three Mile Island acci-
dent), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 (1981).
14. See, e.g., Cabinet Mountains Wilderness/Scotchman's Peak Grizzly Bears v.
Peterson, 685 F.2d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Environmental Assessment contained
adequate mitigation measures to counteract adverse impact on grizzly bear popula-
tion resulting from exploratory drilling); Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 627 F.2d
1238 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Secretary of Interior not obligated to prepare EIS when
deciding not to take affirmative action to prohibit State of Alaska from conducting
wolf-hunt on federal land).
15. See, e.g., Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223
(1980) (NEPA designed to insure fully-informed decision, but agency need not ele-
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Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ),' 6 a NEPA-created
agency,'7 have sought to clarify the EIS filing procedures. The limita-
tions of a court's power to inquire into agency action or inaction also
have been the subject of litigation. In Sierra Club v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers ("Westway"), 18 for example, both issues
arose: (1) whether the Army Corps of Engineers had failed to fulfill its
obligations under NEPA by filing an EIS of questionable accuracy;' 9
and (2) whether the district court had abused its discretion by interfer-
ing with the agency's decision to grant a landfill permit. 20
This Comment will discuss the historical background of NEPA and
recent interpretations of EIS requirements. The limitations placed on
judicial interference with agency action will also be reviewed. Fi-
nally, after analyzing "Westway," 21 this Comment will suggest how
NEPA might be improved.
II. Historical Background
On May 29, 1969, NEPA was introduced in Congress.22 Prior to
that time, public interest groups generally were unsuccessful in bring-
vate environmental concerns over other concerns); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (agencies
must employ at least the statutory minima in preparing an EIS); Kleppe v. Sierra
Club, 427 U.S. 390, 399, 410 n.21 (1976) (NEPA requires EIS solely for major federal
action and reviewing courts can only insure that agencies have taken a "hard look" at
environmental consequences of their actions).
16. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1517 (1982).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1976).
18. 541 F. Supp. 1367 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); see also notes 240-70 infra and accompa-
nying text (discussion of "Westway").
19. Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 82-6125 (2d Cir.
Feb. 25, 1983).
20. Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs was decided on appeal to
the Second Circuit in two separate opinions. The first, Sierra Club v. Hennessy, No.
82-6175 (2d Cir. Dec. 6, 1982), dealt with the issue of the Federal Highway Adminis-
tration reimbursement for the landfill right-of-way. The district court had enjoined
the reimbursement on grounds that the FHWA and the New York State Department
of Transportation had violated NEPA. 541 F. Supp. 1367, 1383 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
The Second Circuit reversed, finding that the plaintiffs had not shown the requisite
irreparable harm to support the injunction. Sierra Club v. Hennessy, slip. op. at 620.
The second opinion, Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 82-
6125 (2d Cir. Feb. 25, 1983) addressed the substantive NEPA issues. The Second
Circuit decided that the FHWA and the Army Corps of Engineers had violated
NEPA and ordered the agencies to prepare a supplemental impact statement discus-
sing the impact of the Westway project on the Hudson river fisheries. Slip op. at
2041.
21. See notes 18-20 supra.
22. 115 CONG. REC. 14,346 (1969).
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ing suit against agency actions that presented risks of environmental
abuse.23 Courts were reluctant to review or overturn agency decisions
in the absence of a policy demanding judicial scrutiny of environmen-
tally threatening activities. 24 By establishing a national policy on the
environment, 25 Congress sought to provide courts with a means to
compel agency consideration of the environmental impacts of their
proposed actions. Congress also hoped that agencies would give
greater consideration to implementing actions possibly detrimental to
the environment. 26
In addition to establishing a national policy on the environment,
NEPA authorized expanded research to understand "our national re-
sources, the environment, and human ecology."' 27 NEPA also vested in
the federal government an ongoing responsibility to improve and
coordinate federal plans and programs to protect and preserve the
environment. 28 Moreover, the Act recognized that the right to a
healthful environment is a personal right. 2 Therefore, under NEPA,
protection of the environment is both an individual and a collective
responsibility.30
NEPA created the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) to
serve as the coordinating body to interpret and enforce NEPA poli-
cies. 3' The CEQ is responsible for: reviewing and appraising federal
programs and activities in light of NEPA policies; conducting investi-
gations, studies and research of environmental subjects; and analyzing
current environmental information. 32 The CEQ provides procedural
23. Comment, The National Environmental Policy Act oj 1969: Analysis and
Judicial Interpretation, 25 BAYLOR L. REv. 71, 77 (1973).
24. Id.
25. See text accompanying notes 2-4 supra.
26. Comment, supra note 23, at 90.
27. 115 CONG. REc. 14,347 (1969), quoted in Noe v. Metropolitan Rapid Transit
Auth. (MARTA), 644 F.2d 434, 438 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1126 (1981).
See also 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976) (NEPA purposes described).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1976).
29. Id. § 4331(c).
30. Id. NEPA is the manifestation of the national environmental policy of "the
Federal Government, in cooperation with State and local governments, and other
concerned public and private organizations." Id. § 4331(a). Moreover, "Congress
recognizes that ... each person has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation
and enhancement of the environment." Id. § 4331(c).
31. NEPA also established the Environmental Protection Agency which, in con-
trast to the CEQ, is empowered to establish and enforce environmental protection
standards, a task previously delegated to various environmental agencies. Id. § 4321,
Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970.
32. The CEQ also assists and advises the President in preparing an Environmen-
tal Quality Report. 42 U.S.C. § 4334(1) (1976). See id. § 4341. The CEQ recom-
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regulations33 for NEPA obligations of agencies proposing federal
actions. These regulations are applicable to and binding on all federal
agencies for implementing NEPA provisions, except where compli-
ance would be inconsistent with other statutory requirements.
3 4
The underlying purpose of NEPA as set forth in the regulations is to
assist public officials in making well-informed decisions which con-
sider environmental factors.35 Thus, accurate environmental informa-
tion must be made available to both public officials and private
citizens who. are then requested to respond to a proposal before a
decision is reached by the agency .3 This requirement insures that the
decision makers have weighed environmental factors with other rele-
vant factors, 37 such as economic and social effects,38 before action is
taken. An additional safeguard is provided by the congressional man-
date that all agencies include a detailed EIS with every recommenda-
tion concerning proposals for legislation and "major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."
3 9
III. Role of the EIS
A. Purpose
An EIS is proof that an agency has considered the environmental
impacts of its proposed actions before reaching final decisions. 40 In
mends to the President national policies to foster and promote the improvement of
environmental quality, documents changes in the environment and issues yearly
reports to the President on the state and conditions of the environment. The CEQ
also furnishes studies, reports and recommendations of policy and legislation as are
requested by the President. Id. § 4344.
33. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1517 (1982). In 1978, the CEQ guidelines were changed
to regulations. The new regulations apply only to impact statements filed after July
30, 1979. See Id. § 1506.12. See also Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979)
(prior to CEQ amendment, CEQ guidelines were "entitled to substantial defer-
ence").
These regulations contain, inter alia, a restatement of NEPA purposes, EIS proce-
dures, public meeting procedures, and the National Oil and Hazardous Substances
Pollution Contingency Plan. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1517 (1982).
34. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.3. See also notes 94-105 infra and accompanying text
(discussion of statutory conflict).
35. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c) (1982).
36. Id. §§ 1500.1(b), 1503.1(1), (2), (4).
37. Id. See note 5 supra.
38. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regu-
latory Comm'n, 685 F.2d 459, 477-78 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (EIS table intended to reflect
environmental effects of a uranium fuel cycle found arbitrary and capricious because
the table failed to allow for consideration of health, socioeconomic and cumulative
effects).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976).
40. As the District of Columbia Circuit stated, "decision-making under NEPA
must be organized in such a manner that all of the reasonably foreseeable environ-
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requiring such proof, Congress intended that agencies be fully aware
of the degree of environmental impacts of their projects. 4' Moreover,
because environmental considerations are now a priority in decision
making, 42 these considerations must be made available to the public.
Public disclosure serves as a check on proposed actions and permits
public feedback relevant to the desirability of actions which could
cause environmental harm.
43
Agencies also must consult with other government bodies with
special expertise or legal jurisdiction over the subject matter before
issuing an EIS.4 4 In short, requiring the preparation of an EIS for
major federal actions affecting the environment is some protection
against environmentally harmful decisions: not only must the agency
show that it has considered environmental impacts, but also that
suggestions and alternatives received from the public and other fed-
eral agencies have been factored into the decision.
45
B. Procedural Requirements
NEPA requires the preparation and filing of an EIS for all major
federal actions "significantly affecting the quality of the human envi-
ronment. '4 6 To meet this requirement, the agency action must be
"final," 47 the proposal must be for a "major Federal action," 48 and the
project must have a significant effect on the environment. 49
mental effects of a proposed action enter into an agency's decision to take the action."
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 685 F.2d 459 (D.C. Cir. 1982). See Comment, supra note 23, at 74-75.
41. Among other things, the EIS insures that each agency decision has considered
all possible alternatives to the particular project. Comment, supra note 23, at 75.
42. Id. at 72. Evidently, prior to NEPA's enactment, environmental concerns
were not a substantial consideration in agency decision making. Id.
43. See notes 158-63 infra and accompanying text.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976).
45. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1503.1-1503.4 (1982). Agencies must assess and consider com-
ments both individually and collectively and respond to the comments. Id. §
1503.4(a). These responses must be included in the final EIS with the comments
attached. Id. § 1503.4(b). The public comment process strengthens the EIS, and aids
agencies in making better environmental decisions. Certainly without such processes,
or without an EIS of any sort, agencies might make more environmentally callous
decisions, a result NEPA intended to avoid. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1976).
However, agencies need not "elevate environmental concerns over other appropriate
considerations." Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227
(1980). See also Milkovich, The Decline of the Environmental Mandate:-A Modern
West Side Story, 41 LA. L. REV. 1354 (1981) (in depth analysis of Strycker's Bay and
its impact).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976).
47. See notes 50-58 infra and accompanying text.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976). This section outlines how the agency makes
such a determination. See Shea, The Judicial Standard.for Review of Environmental
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1. Final Agency Action
Courts have defined final agency action on a case-by-case basis.
Grants of funds to acquire land for new project sites, 50 grants of
permits to build parks and industrial complexes, 5' and submissions of
prospecti to congressional committees for approval for construction of
federal office buildings52 have been construed as final.
By contrast, proposals for studies of contemplated projects 53 or
proposals for "hypothetical" highways 54 are not "final," nor are non-
overt acts. 55 For example, the failure of the Secretary of the Interior to
act to prevent a state-conducted wolf-hunt on federal land was not
considered a final agency action by the court. 5 In these cases, an EIS
is not required, because, as the Second Circuit recently declared, such
non-final actions have "no impact on anything. ' 57 Moreover, the
court has stated that the judiciary has "no business adjudicating the
legality of non-events." 58
Impact Statement Threshold Decisions, 9 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 63 (1980)
(analysis of judicial review regarding CEQ regulations and NEPA mandates). See
also notes 59-73 infra and accompanying text (discussion of "major Federal action").
49. See notes 74-87 infra and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g, Friedman Bros. Inv. Co. v. Lewis, 676 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1982)
(agency's grant of funds to acquire land for site of new bus maintenance depot and
exemption of project were final agency actions, although no formal action to acquire
the property by condemnation had occurred).
51. See, e.g., Kentucky ex. rel. Beshear v. Alexander, 655 F.2d 714 (6th Cir.
1981) (permit grant to Indiana Port Commission to build port and industrial complex
along Ohio River was final agency action requiring EIS).
52. See, e.g., Realty Income Trust v. Eckerd, 564 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(Draft EIS should be filed with prospectus for construction of federal office building,
although final EIS not necessary until after congressional approval).
53. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Johnson, 629 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.
1980) (study of a contemplated project for skimming the Hudson River as a possible
solution to drought problems did not require an EIS because a study would not affect
the quality of the human environment).
54. See, e.g., National Wildlife Fed'n v. Goldschmidt, 677 F.2d 259 (2d Cir.
1982). In Goldschmidt, the court reasoned that where the ultimate decision to build
a highway had not been made, no EIS was necessary. Id. at 263. The court demon-
strated its reluctance to interfere by declaring that the spending of money on design
work was not a call for judicial review. Id. at 264.
55. See notes 56-58 infra and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 627 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(Secretary of Interior not required to file EIS when he did not act to prevent State of
Alaska from conducting wolf-hunt on federal land).
57. Environmental Defense Fund v. Johnson, 629 F.2d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 1980).
58. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Goldschmidt, 677 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1982).
1983]
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2. Major Federal Action
Having determined that the action is final, it becomes necessary to
decide whether the proposal is for a "major Federal action."-" Major
federal actions are those which receive large federal expenditures or
require ongoing federal involvement with the project. Usually the
projects have nationwide significance.60 For example, the licensing of
a nuclear power plant is a "well settled . . . 'major Federal action
[s]ignificantly affecting the quality of the human environment.' "61
Courts have accepted an agency's conclusion that a proposal for a
project will not significantly affect the environment and therefore is
not a major federal action.6 2
Courts, however, may not accept an agency's determination that an
action is not a major federal action where that action would signifi-
cantly affect or degrade the environment.6 3 In such an instance, the
court may determine that the action is a major federal action, despite
the agency's contrary determination. Finally, an action which has
already been taken or completed 4 will not be deemed a major federal
action.6 5 Courts have found major federal actions in proposals for
59. 42 U.S.C. § 4332; see also Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 399 (1976)
(further development of federal coal reserves did not constitute a major federal
action).
60. See notes 61 & 66-73 infra and accompanying text.
61. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 685 F.2d 459, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976)).
See also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 538-39 (1978) (Atomic Energy Commission acted within its
statutory authority in considering the environmental impacts of fuel processes before
licensing nuclear reactors).
62. See notes 63-65 infra and accompanying text.
63. Columbia Basin Land Protection Ass'n v. Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585, 597 (9th
Cir. 1981) (EIS required where facts alleged which, if true, show that the proposed
project "may significantly degrade some human environmental factor") (emphasis in
original).
64. NEPA requires "future vision" in preparing an EIS. Thus, in Concerned
About Trident v. Rumsfeld, 555 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (amended decision) it was
not surprising that the court ordered a supplemental EIS to analyze the environmen-
tal impacts of the Trident Nuclear Submarine Program, a further development of the
Polaris/Poseidon System, for a reasonable period after 1981. As the court stated, "it is
imperative that [the Navy] make a reasonable effort to discern what the effects of
Trident's future operation will be." Id. at 830. See also Columbia Basin Land
Protection Ass'n v. Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585, 592 (9th Cir. 1981) (NEPA's purpose is
to assure that federal agencies are fully aware of the present and future environmen-
tal impact of their decisions).
65. In Richland Park Homeowners Ass'n v. Pierce, 671 F.2d 935, 941 (5th Cir.
1982), the court refused to order a post-completion injunction, claiming that the
"basic thrust" of NEPA was "to provide assistance for evaluating proposals for
[Vol. XI
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constructing interstate highways;66 grants of construction and opera-
tion permits for nuclear power plants;6 7 grants of leases to drill for oil,
gas and minerals; 68 and proposals by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission for rates on recyclables.69
Courts do not require an EIS for a proposal for a state, local or
'non-major" action or for an action which is a continuation of an
existing project. 70 Moreover, an EIS is not required for a proposal not
yet at the recommendation stage.7 ' Examples of such actions are an
agency's grant of a permit for a power line which received no federal
funding7 2 and an agency's approval of mining plans in one section of
an area for which an EIS had already been prepared.
73
prospective federal action in the light of their future effect upon environmental
factors, not to serve as a basis for after-the-fact critical evaluation subsequent to
substantial completion of the construction" (citing Aertsen v. Landrieu, 637 F.2d 12,
19 (1st Cir. 1980) (because EIS is a forward-looking instrument, court refused to
order an after-the-fact EIS and found that the demolition of existing structures on the
site of a federally subsidized housing project did not constitute a "major federal
action")).
66. See, e.g., Adler v. Lewis, 675 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1982) (injunction to
prevent acquisition of right-of-way for proposed Interstate Highway 90 expansion
denied); Citizens to Preserve Wilderness Park, Inc. v. Adams, 543 F. Supp. 21 (D.
Neb. 1981), aff'd, No. 81-2280 (8th Cir. 1982) (injunction to prevent use of park land
for highway project denied); Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 541
F. Supp. 1367 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (injunction granted to prevent construction of West-
side Highway Project).
67. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (Atomic Energy Commission grant of
nuclear power licenses upheld on grounds that lower courts had no authority to
overturn agency decision); Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld, 555 F.2d 817
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (amended decision) (Navy ordered to consider further alternatives
to the Trident Nuclear Submarine project in a supplement to an existing EIS).
68. See, e.g., California v. Watt, 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982) (sale of leases to
drill for and extract oil and gas in Outer Continental Shelf was major federal action).
69. See, e.g, Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures ("SCRAP II"), 422 U.S. 289 (1975) (EIS required for proposed
increase in transportation rates for recyclable materials).
70. See, e.g., Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976) (where no legislation
for major federal action proposed but rather proposal is for action of either local or
state scope, EIS not required for approval of plans for further development of coal
reserves).
71. See, e.g., "SCRAP II," 422 U.S. 289, 320-21 (1975). In "SCRAP II," the
Supreme Court stated that an agency must prepare an EIS when making recommen-
dations or reports on proposals for federal action. Id. However, in "SCRAP II," the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) had not submitted a proposal recommenda-
tion or report until Oct. 1972, when the ICC proposed new railroad rates for
recyclable materials. Id. Thus, the Court held that submission of an EIS was not
required until Oct. 1972. Id.
72. See, e.g., Winnebago Tribe of Neb. v. Ray, 621 F.2d 269, 272 (8th Cir.
1980) (where there was no direct or even indirect federal funding, project is not a
"major Federal action").
73. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
1983]
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3. "Significantly affecting the quality of the human environment"
Once an agency has determined that its final proposal is for a major
federal action, the agency must decide whether the action will "signif-
icantly [affect] the quality of the human environment." 74 The decision
process begins with a determination of whether the proposal is one
which normally requires an EIS. First, an Environmental Assessment
(EA), a concise public document which sets forth the evidence and
analysis for determining whether to prepare an EIS, is issued. 75 The
EA acts as a mini-EIS 6 and includes brief discussions of the need for
the proposal, alternatives, and the environmental impact of the proj-
ect, as well as a list of agencies and persons consulted in the prepara-
tion of the proposal and the EA. 77 If, on the basis of the EA, the
agency finds that no significant environmental impact would result
from the proposed action, the agency need not prepare an EIS.78
Instead, the agency is required to prepare a Finding of No Significant
74. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976). In Columbia Basin Land Protection Ass'n v.
Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1981), the court decided that the standard of
"significantly affecting" the environment is not met unless facts have been alleged
which show that the proposed project may "significantly degrade some human
environmental factor." Id. at 597. In Columbia Basin, an association of farmers
sought an injunction to prevent construction of a 500 kilovolt power transmission line
across their lands. The Ninth Circuit found that the EIS prepared by the responsible
agency conformed with NEPA's procedural mandates. Id. at 590. Moreover, the
court determined that the decision to commence the project, a decision based on
legitimate economic considerations reflected in the EIS, was neither arbitrary nor
capricious. Id.
See also City and County of San Francisco v. United States, 615 F.2d 498, 500 (9th
Cir. 1980); City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 673 (9th Cir. 1975) (standard of
"significantly affecting the environment" met whenever the plaintiff alleged facts
which, if true, show that the proposed project may significantly degrade some
human environmental factor).
75. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(a)(1), (2) (1982).
76. Id. § 1508.9(b). The EA helps an agency comply with NEPA when an EIS is
not necessary and facilitates in the preparation of an EIS when one is necessary. Id. §
1508.9(a)(2), (3). Neither an EIS nor an EA may be necessary if the action fits the
definition of a categorical exclusion. Id. § 1508.4. Categorical exclusions are actions
which neither individually nor cumulatively have a significant effect on the human
environment, as determined by the agency in accordance with its own procedures for
implementing the CEQ regulations. Id. The CEQ regulations mention, however,
that there are certain extraordinary circumstances in which an action that would
normally be a categorical exclusion may have a significant environmental effect. Id.
§ 1508.4.
77. Id. § 1508.9(b).
78. Id. § 1501.4(e).
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Impact (FONSI).79 The FONSI must be made available to the af-
fected public8 ° in the same manner as an EIS.1l
An agency's determination of how the proposed action will affect
the environment must be both reasonable and adequately supported . 2
The reasonableness of this determination may depend on such factors
as: the environmental significance of new information; the probable
accuracy of the information; the degree of care with which the agency
considered the information and evaluated the impact; and the extent
to which the agency's decision not to prepare an EIS was supported by
an explanation or data.8 3
If an agency's decision not to file an EIS is found to be unreasona-
ble, a court may order an agency to comply with NEPA by filing an
EIS. 84 Preparation of the EIS could delay a project for an indefinite
period of time, 5 should a court enjoin a project pending the issuance
79. A FONSI is a document which briefly explains why the action will not have a
significant effect on the environment, and that therefore an EIS will not be issued.
Id. § 1508.13.
80. The "affected" public includes any individuals or group upon whom the
proposed action will or may have an effect. Id. § 1508.3.
81. Id. § 1501.4(e)(1).
82. Cabinet Mountains Wilderness/Scotchman's Peak Grizzly Bears v. Peterson,
685 F.2d 678, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (agency's decision not to prepare EIS for
exploratory mineral drilling was reasonable because the agency provided adequate
mitigation measures to counteract the possible adverse impacts on the grizzly bear
population). See also Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 621 F.2d 1017,
1027 (9th Cir. 1980) (Corps made thorough study of effect of Maacama Fault and
reasonably concluded that "no substantial adverse effects were presented").
Timeliness also must be read in light of a "rule of reason." Realty Income Trust v.
Eckerd, 564 F.2d 447, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1977). An EIS should be prepared at the
earliest possible time for consideration of all alternatives. Friedman Bros. v. Lewis,
676 F.2d 1317, 1320 (9th Cir. 1982).
83. California v. Watt, 683 F.2d 1253, 1267-68 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing Warm
Springs Dam Task Force, 621 F.2d at 1024 (9th Cir. 1980)). In Watt, a U.S.
Geological Survey study of the Outer Continental Shelf became available one month
prior to the release of an EIS for a proposed sale of oil and gas drilling leases. The
new study was incorporated into an addendum to the EIS. 683 F.2d at 1258. A
document (SID) assessing the environmental impact of the lease sale and concluding
that a SEIS was unnecessary also was issued. Id. Although the addendum and SID
were not sent through the public comment process, the court found this course of
action reasonable. Id. at 1267-68.
84. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n, 685 F.2d 459, 480, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (case remanded upon
a finding that the agency's failure to file an adequate EIS was unreasonable).
85. California v. Watt, 683 F.2d 1253, 1268 (9th Cir. 1982). The court implied,
however, that the avoidance of delay might be a factor in a court's determination of
whether the agency had acted reasonably. Id. For example, in Watt, the court
decided that the absence of public commenting process did not render the Secretary's
action unreasonable. Id. Otherwise, as the court stated, "the threshold decision not
19831
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of the EIS. 86 If a court finds that an agency's decision not to file an EIS
was reasonable, however, a court will not order the filing of an EIS.8 7
C. Exceptions to the Filing Requirement
There are certain circumstances which courts have classified as
exceptions to the NEPA requirement for filing an EIS. In the land-
mark case of Andrus v. Sierra Club,88 the Supreme Court decided that
an impact statement need not accompany an appropriations request.8 9
An appropriations request suggests funds for an action already pro-
posed. 0 In Andrus, the Court interpreted NEPA as applying to rec-
ommendations that propose actions rather than to suggestions of how
to fund those actions. 91 Similarly, the District of Columbia Circuit has
held that NEPA does not require impact statements where no overt
action has taken place. 92 Impact statements need accompany only
those decisions that an agency anticipates will lead to action. 93
to supplement an EIS would become as burdensome as preparing the [SEIS] itself,
and the continuing duty to gather and evaluate new information . .. could prolong
NEPA review beyond reasonable limits." Id.
86. See notes 232-39 infra and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 627 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
In that case, the Secretary of Interior did not curtail a program to hunt wolves on
federal lands. This wolf-hunt was designed to protect moose herds. The court refused
to order an EIS, noting that NEPA refers to decisions which agencies anticipate will
lead to action. Id. at 1243. The Secretary's non-overt act did not constitute a major
federal action within the meaning of NEPA. Id. at 1239-40. As the court concluded,
"[n]o agency could meet its NEPA obligations if it had to prepare an EIS every time
the agency had power to act but did not do so." Id. at 1246.
88. 442 U.S. 347 (1979). In Andrus, the Sierra Club, the National Parks and
Conservation Association and the Natural Resources Defense Council sued the Secre-
tary of the Interior and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget for
NEPA violations. The plaintiffs claimed that the proposed curtailments of the Na-
tional Wildlife Refuge System budget would significantly affect the quality of the
human environment and therefore required an EIS. The Supreme Court disagreed.
Id. at 349.
For a more comprehensive discussion of Andrus, see Note, Environmental Law-
The National Environmental Policy Act-Andrus v. Sierra Club, 26 N.Y.L. ScH. L.
REV. 385 (1981); Note, NEPA: An Ambitious Purpose; A Partial Demise, 15 TULSA
L.J. 553 (1980).
89. 442 U.S. at 362.
90. Id.
91. Id. NEPA requires that environmental concerns be integrated into the proc-
ess of agency decision making. In the case of appropriations requests, however, the
decisions have already been made, and therefore preparation of an EIS at the
appropriations stage would serve no purpose. Id. at 363.
92. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 627 F.2d 1238, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
93. Id. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Appalachian Regional Comm'n, 677 F.2d
883 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In that case, the court determined that a programmatic EIS
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An EIS will not be required where conflict exists between NEPA
and another statute governing the action.9 4 In Flint Ridge Develop-
ment Co. v. Scenic Rivers Association of Oklahoma,9 5 a conflict be-
tween NEPA and the Disclosure Act9" compelled the Supreme Court
to declare that where clear and unavoidable conflict in statutory
authority exists, NEPA must yield. 97 The Court added that even if the
action involved was a "major Federal action" normally requiring an
EIS, under the facts of the case, the EIS requirement was inapplica-
ble.98 Consistent with the Court's statement in Flint Ridge, when
information contained in an EIS may not be divulged under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),9 9 in the interest of protecting
national defense or foreign policy, NEPA requirements are super-
seded.100
need not be prepared for a project which was begun prior to the passing of NEPA and
which was nearly complete at the time the suit was instituted. The court reasoned
that a retrospective statement would be unnecessary because it would not shed more
decision making light on the parts of the federally assisted highway development
project yet to be built. Id. at 884. A programmatic EIS deals with broad environmen-
tal consequences attendant upon wide-ranging federal programs. Id. at 888. In
contrast, a site-specific EIS deals with the "more particularized considerations arising
once the overall program reaches the 'second tier,' or implementation stage of its
development." Id. at 888. See also 40 C.F.R. § 1502.20 (1982) (explanation of
tiering).
94. See 115 CONG. REC. 39,703 (1969) (each agency should comply with the
directives set out in § 102(2) of NEPA "unless the existing law applicable to such
agency's operations expressly prohibits or makes full compliance with one of the
directives impossible"). Id.
95. 426 U.S. 776 (1976).
96. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The Disclosure Act is
limited to interstate land sales. Id. § 1701.
97. 426 U.S. at 788. In Flint Ridge, the respondents had requested the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development to prepare an EIS for a housing develop-
ment project. Under the Disclosure Act, however, the Secretary had a statutory duty
to allow statements of record to go into effect within 30 days of filing. The Secretary
could not, therefore, simultaneously prepare EIS's on proposed developments. Id. at
791.
98. Id. But see California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 775 (9th Cir. 1982) (there was
no "clear and unavoidable conflict" between the National Forest Management Act
and NEPA and therefore no exception to the EIS requirement).
99. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
100. Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139
(1981). In Weinberger, the Court ruled that where the Navy was not required to
prepare an EIS under the FOIA, it need not prepare a "hypothetical EIS"-a
"creature of judicial cloth, not legislative cloth ... and not mandated by any ...
statutory or regulatory provisions," and not mentioned in NEPA. Id. at 140-41, 144.
The Court explained that by intending the Freedom of Information Act to govern the
release to the public of information in impact statements, Congress struck a balance
between the needs of the public to know what is contained in an EIS and the
necessity of non-disclosure for security reasons. Id. at 145.
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Another example of statutory conflict concerns the listing of endan-
gered species. In Pacific Legal Foundation v. Andrus,10' the Sixth
Circuit refused to require the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS) to file an EIS when listing a species as endangered or threat-
ened.10 2 Filing an EIS is proof that an agency has considered environ-
mental impacts before making a decision on proposed action. Accord-
ing to the Endangered Species Act (ESA),' 10 3 however, an agency has
no authority to consider environmental impacts when listing a species
under the ESA.I0 4 Thus, as the court noted, preparation of an EIS in
such a case would be a "waste of time."10 5
D. Supplemental EIS
An agency may be required to file a Supplemental Environmental
Impact Statement (SEIS) after a draft or a final EIS has been pre-
pared and issued. A SEIS will be required when: (1) the agency makes
substantial changes in the proposed action which relate to environ-
101. 657 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1981).
102. Id. at 835.
103. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976). Where NEPA regulations conflict with the
specific statutory obligations of federal agencies to comply with criteria or standards
of environmental quality, the specific statutory obligations will supersede NEPA
considerations. 42 U.S.C. § 4334 (1976). Specifically, preserving endangered or
threatened species has been accorded the highest priority by Congress. TVA v. Hill,
437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978). Moreover, the filing of an EIS would not serve the purposes
of the Endangered Species Act, which are to "provide a means whereby the ecosys-
tems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be con-
served, to provide a program for conservation, and to achieve the purposes of the
treaties and conventions signed with foreign countries to conserve various species."
Andrus, 657 F.2d at 835. See also 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1976) (purposes of Endan-
gered Species Act).
104. Andrus, 657 F.2d at 836.
105. Id. The court noted that listing the species as endangered or threatened
furthers NEPA purposes despite the absence of an EIS because the listing seeks to
"preserve the environment and prevent the irretrievable loss of a natural resource."
Id. at 837. See also Providence Road Community Ass'n v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 683 F.2d 80, 82 (4th Cir. 1982) (preparation of EIS not required where
agency concluded that preparing one for design plans of a wastewater treatment
project would be a "bureaucratic exercise, yielding only another compilation of the
information already on hand"). Another example of a conflict of statutes where the
more specific statute supersedes NEPA is the Alaska Natural Gas Transportation Act
(ANGTA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 719-719o (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The Act provides that "no
court shall have jurisdiction to consider questions respecting the sufficiency of [EIS's
for action under ANGTA] under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969." Id.
§ 719h(c) (3). See also The NEPA and Energy Legislation: The Preemption of Judicial
Review, 14 U.S.F.L. REV. 403 (1980) (discussion of history and analysis of ANGTA
and NEPA).
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mental concerns; or (2) significant new circumstances arise or new
information is discovered which may be relevant to environmental
concerns.10 6 The SEIS must be prepared, circulated and filed in the
same manner as a draft or final EIS. 0 7
The Fifth Circuit recently interpreted the SEIS requirements in
Environmental Defense Fund v. Marsh. 108 In Marsh, the court stated
that a SEIS is required whenever the EIS has become deficient be-
cause certain environmental effects of the project were not discussed
or design features or project purposes were modified significantly after
the original EIS was filed. 100 The court explained that, notwithstand-
ing the agency's intent in implementing the changes, a SEIS must be
prepared whenever significant environmental impacts arise.110 Thus,
even if the impact is beneficial to the environment, the impact must
be discussed in an EIS or SEIS. 1'
Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble 2 is an example of an
exception to the SEIS requirement. In that case, the Army Corps of
Engineers filed an EIS for the Warm Springs Dam Project several
years before a United States Geological Service study became avail-
able. The study indicated that the Maacama Fault, located six miles
from the dam, might generate anearthquake of greater magnitude
than the dam was designed to withstand." 3 The Corps made an
immediate "thorough study"'1 4 and concluded that no substantial
adverse environmental effects would result.1 5 The Ninth Circuit
106. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9 (1982).
107. Id.
108. 651 F.2d 983 (5th Cir. 1981). In Marsh, the Environmental Defense Fund
claimed that the Army Corps of Engineers had violated NEPA by failing to update its
EIS after instituting changes in the planning and construction of the Tennessee-
Tombigbee Waterway. The court ordered the immediate preparation of a SEIS. Id.
at 1006-07. See also Comment, Supplemental EIS Mandated for Tennessee-Tombig-
bee Waterway, 11 ENVTL. L. RrR. 10213-18 (1981) (analysis of Environmental
Defense Fund v. Marsh).
109. 651 F.2d at 988-89. The court noted that where the purpose of supplementa-
tion was to clarify. or amplify a point of concern raised after the final statement was
filed with the CEQ, as opposed to instituting a significant change in the action, a
document less formal than a SEIS might be filed. Id. at 989. The "less formal
document" now takes the form of an Environmental Assessment (EA) to determine
whether a supplemental EIS is required. Id. at 989 n.7. See notes 75-78 supra and
accompanying text.
110. 651 F.2d at 993.
111. Id.
112. 621 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1980).
113. Id. at 1019.
114. Id. at 1027.
115. id.
1983]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
found that the Corps' determination was reasonable, and did not
order the preparation of a SEIS. 16
IV. Preparation of the EIS
A. Contents of the EIS
Under NEPA, each EIS must include: the environmental impact
and avoidable adverse effects of the proposed action, as well as alter-
natives to the project, including the alternative of no action." 7
1. Impact
The EIS should be "the means of assessing the environmental im-
pact of proposed agency actions rather than justifying decisions al-
ready made."" 8 Thus, the assessment of the impact should be "ana-
lytic" rather than "encyclopedic," I" and should discuss the impact in
proportion to its significance.12 0 Significant impacts are those that
pose risks of environmental damage.' 2' In Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 22 for
example, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission asserted that nuclear
wastes stored in a repository would have no significant impact on the
116. Id. Warm Springs Dam Task Force has been litigated several times. In 1974,
Justice Douglas granted a stay pending appeal. 417 U.S. 1301 (1974). In 1977, the
District Court for the Northern District of California and the Ninth Circuit denied
the Task Force's petition for a preliminary injunction on the basis of expert testimony
that there was no evidence to indicate that the Maacama Fault would break, and
because the courts were reluctant to interfere with the administrative decision mak-
ing process. 431 F. Supp. 320, 323; 565 F.2d 549, 552. As the district court stated, "to
allow the courts to send the Corps back to the drawing board every time new and
compelling arguments or materials are developed after completion of an EIS would
enable industrious and imaginative opponents of any given project to forever post-
pone its construction." 431 F. Supp. at 323.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976). In addition, the EIS must discuss the relation-
ship between local short term uses of the environment and the maintenance and
enhancement of long term productivity and irreversible and irretrievable commit-
ments of resources involved in the project. Id.
118. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.2(g) (1982).
119. Id. § 1502.2(a).
120. Id. § 1502.2(b). The statement should contain "only enough discussion to
show why more study is not warranted." Id.
121. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 685 F.2d 459, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The discussion of significant environ-
mental risks entails an analysis of the probabilities or possibilities of environmental
damage. See Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld, 555 F.2d 817, 830 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (amended decision) (Navy required to make reasonable effort to determine
effects of project).
122. 685 F.2d 459.
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environment and therefore would pose no significant risk of environ-
mental damage. 123 The District of Columbia Circuit concluded that
this finding was a "clear error in judgment," 2 4 declaring that "uncer-
tainties" 125 and primary health, socioeconomic and cumulative effects
should be included in the discussion. 2 6 As the court noted, the discus-
sion should reveal the meaning of impacts in terms of human health or
other environmental values, considering, for example, the number of
cancer deaths or genetic defects to be expected, as well as the potential
social, psychological and economic disruptions that might accompany
the waste repository siting. 27
Insignificant impacts, by contrast, should be discussed only
briefly. 28 For example, in Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld, 29
the court held that the Navy's discussion of impacts in an EIS for the
Trident nuclear submarine base need not include a detailed discussion
of the minor or remote social and economic impacts of the project. '0
2. Alternatives
A detailed discussion of alternatives' 3' to the project, including the
alternative of no action, is also of primary significance. The alterna-
123. Id. at 480.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 477. The court stated that the NRC should have considered the
uncertainties underlying the assumption that no radiological effluents would be
released into the biosphere once the wastes were sealed in a permanent repository.
id.
126. Id. at 477-78. The court found that the NRC impact table was deficient for
failing to provide for consideration of these effects. Id. at 467.
127. Id. at 486.
128. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.2(b) (1982).
129. 555 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (amended decision).
130. Id. at 828. In general, the court found the Navy's EIS to be reasonable. Id. at
824-25. However, the court ordered the Navy to supplement the statement with both
an analysis of environmental impacts for a reasonable period after 1981 and further
discussion of alternative systems and their environmental consequences. Id. at 830.
131. See Piedmont Heights Civic Club, Inc. v. Moreland, 637 F.2d 430 (5th Cir.
1981). In Piedmont Heights, the Fifth Circuit explained that the purpose of requiring
alternatives is to "assure that the government agency as a decision-making body has
considered methods of achieving the desired goal other than the proposed action." Id.
at 436. The court held that the failure to consider mass transit as an alternative to
widening the interstate highway did not violate NEPA. Id. The court explained that
where a mass transit system already exists, the agency should consider the need for
/ highway improvements "in light of the existing plans for mass transit." Id.
See also California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982) (Forest Service's over-
sight of an obvious alternative was unreasonable); Concerned About Trident v.
Rumsfeld, 555 F.2d 817, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (amended decision) (SEIS ordered for
further discussion of alternatives which Navy considered before choosing the dedi-
cated site).
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tives must be reasonable and supported by objective data. 132 The
decisionmaker should be able to assess the alternatives and arrive at a
reasonable conclusion concerning the proposed action.1 33 Moreover,
the agency need discuss only feasible alternatives. 134
In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.,'135 the Supreme Court recognized that limits
might be set regarding discussion of alternatives. 13 According to the
Court, an EIS is not rendered inadequate "simply because the agency
failed to include every alternative device and thought conceivable by
the mind of man." 137 Lower courts, following Vermont Yankee, also
have held that limited discussions of alternatives may not necessarily
render an impact statement insufficient. 38 Courts generally have left
the specificity of treatment of alternatives to agency discretion. 131
Another area of uncertainty is whether NEPA requires the discus-
sion of alternatives to be conclusive and whether those conclusions
require supporting details. In general, the answer to both questions
depends upon the circumstances of the particular case.140 For exam-
ple, in Citizens to Preserve Wilderness Park, Inc. v. Adams, 14 1 the
132. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (1982).
133. Citizens to Preserve Wilderness Park, Inc. v. Adams, 543 F. Supp. 21 (D.
Neb. 1981), aJJ'd, No. 81-2280 (8th Cir. June 30, 1982). See also 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14
(1982) (alternatives requirements set forth).
134. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 551 (1978); Aertsen v. Landrieu, 637 F.2d 12, 21 (1st Cir.
1980); Grazing Fields Farm v. Goldschmidt, 626 F.2d 1068, 1074 (1st Cir. 1980);
Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld, 555 F.2d 817, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(amended decision); Citizens Comm. Against Interstate Route 675 v. Lewis, 542 F.
Supp. 496, 544 (S.D. Ohio, 1982).
135. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
136. Id. at 551.
137. Id..
138. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Alexander, 655 F.2d 714 (6th Cir. 1981) (Corps had
not abused its discretion by limiting alternate site consideration); North Slope Bor-
ough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1980), (district court overextended its
power by requiring agency to take more than the requisite "hard look" at alterna-
tives); Citizens to Preserve Wilderness Park, Inc. v. Adams, 543 F. Supp. 21, 34 (D.
Neb. 1981) (EIS must discuss enough reasonable alternatives to enable a decision
maker to make a reasoned choice about feasible and prudent alternatives).
139. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
140. Citizens to Preserve Wilderness Park, Inc. v. Adams, 543 F. Supp. 21, 25 (D.
Neb. 1981), affd, No. 81-2280 (8th Cir. June 30, 1982).
141. Id. This case involved a proposed highway project which would preempt
land from a public park. The court ruled that the EIS was not inadequate. Id. at 33.
In addition, the court found that the Secretary of Transportation's decision to ap-
prove the project on a finding of no prudent and feasible alternatives was not
"arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise contrary to law." Id. at
35.
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Nebraska district court stated that "[w]here the need for the project is
strong, possible alternatives are extremely limited, and the choices
'would not greatly differ' ... ., detail can be less than otherwise."142
Mitigation measures also must be included in the discussion of
alternatives. 143 A supplement to an already existing EIS may not be
required, however, in two instances: (1) where the proposal is modi-
fied by the addition of specific mitigation measures which compensate
completely for adverse environmental impacts stemming from. the
original proposal; and (2) where the "statutory threshhold of signifi-
cant environmental effects is not crossed." 144
3. Social and Economic Factors
If a cost-benefit analysis 45 relevant to the choice among alterna-
tives of different environmental impacts is being prepared, the analy-
sis should be incorporated or appended to the statement. 14 The state-
ment should discuss the relationship between the cost-benefit analysis
and "any analyses of unquantified environmental impacts, values and
amenities." 4 A cost-benefit analysis is not required, however, for the
142. Id. at 25. "The alternative road routes were 'essentially the same tillable farm
land.' " Id.
143. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.14(f), 1508.25(b)(3) (1982). Mitigation includes:
a) Avoiding the impact altogether by not taking a certain action or parts
of an action.
b) Minimizing impacts by limiting the degree or magnitude of the action'
and its implementation.
c) Rectifying the impact by repairing, rehabilitating, or restoring the
affected environment.
d) Reducing or eliminating the impact over time by preservation and
maintenance operations during the life of the action.
e) Compensating for the impact by replacing or providing substitute re-
sources or environments.
Id. § 1508.20.
144. Cabinet Mountains Wilderness/Scotchman's Peak Grizzly Bears v. Peterson,
685 F.2d 678, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The issue of mitigation measures was also
emphasized in "Westway II," 541 F. Supp. 1367, 1374-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
145. A cost-benefit analysis should include an adequate discussion of the compara-
tive costs and benefits associated with each alternative. Columbia Basin Land Protec-
tion Ass'n v. Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585, 593 (9th Cir. 1981). Moreover, "[t]he
balancing of the environmental costs of a project against its economic and technologi-
cal benefits is mandated by NEPA." Id. at 594. See also 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(b).
However, formal cost-benefit analyses usually are not required unless absolutely
crucial for aiding decision makers. Columbia Basin, 643 F.2d at 594.
146. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.23 (1982).
147. Id.
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weighing of the benefits and drawbacks of the alternatives, particu-
larly when important qualitative considerations exist. 48
Although social and economic effects do not by themselves require
an EIS, they may be discussed in an existing statement if they interre-
late with other environmental effects. 14 Recently, in Metropolitan
Edison Company v. People Against Nuclear Energy ("PANE"),150 the
Supreme Court decided a case of first impression-whether a discus-
sion of possible psychological effects must be included in an EIS. 1 51 In
"PANE," the District of Columbia Circuit had held that potential
harms to psychological health and well-being were cognizable under
NEPA. 52 The court stated further that the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission was required to decide whether significant new circumstances
or information concerning the potential psychological effects of con-
tinuing operation of the Three Mile Island nuclear facility had arisen
since the filing of the original impact statement. 53 In a unanimous
decision, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that Congress had not
intended to require federal agencies to consider the risk of psychologi-
cal stress as an environmental impact. 154
In short, impact statements must conform to the NEPA procedural
mandates. An EIS should be as informative as possible under the
circumstances to conform to the main thrust of NEPA-to induce
fully informed decision making. An EIS must indicate that a project's
significant environmental risks, reasonable and feasible alternatives
and significant environmental impacts have been factored into an
148. Id. The CEQ regulations state, however, that the EIS should at least indicate
the qualitative considerations, including those factors not related to environmental
concerns, which are relevant to the decision. Id.
1,19. See Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 51
U.S.L.W. 4371 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1983).
150. Id. If the social and economic effects are deemed cognizable "secondary
impacts," they must be discussed with more brevity than significant impacts. See 40
C.F.R. § 1502.2(b) (1982). See also id. § 1508.27 (definition of significant impacts).
151. "PANE," 51 U.S.L.W. at 4373. See also Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 685 F.2d 459, 477-78 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (EIS should discuss health and socioeconomic effects); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8
(1982).
152. People Against Nuclear Energy v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 678 F.2d 222, 223 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
153. Id. at 235. The case was heard after the nuclear accident occurred in March
1979.
154. "PANE," 51 U.S.L.W. at 4373-74.
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agency's decision. 155 These factors also must be balanced with the
economic, technological and societal effects of the project. 156 As the
District of Columbia Circuit recently stated, "[an] agency can be
asked to do more than to reveal that which it knows and that which it
does not know. It may not be permitted, however, to do any less." 157
B. Issuing An EIS
An impact statement purports to insure meaningful public partici-
pation in decision making at administrative and legislative levels. 158
Therefore, the statement must be circulated to public officials and
citizens-the "affected public"--before decisions are made and action
is taken.15 The CEQ sought to insure public participation by requir-
ing agencies to obtain comments from certain federal agencies. 160 In
addition, before preparing the final EIS, an agency must request
comments from appropriate state and local agencies which are autho-
rized to develop environmental standards, from any agency asking to
receive statements on actions of the kind proposed, and from the
public.'61 The agency proposing the action may request comments on
a final impact statement prior to the final decision.162 After receiving
comments from those solicited, the agency is required to respond to
the comments by modifying or developing new alternatives, supple-
menting or improving its analysis, making factual corrections, or
explaining why the comments do not warrant further response.16 3
155. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 685 F.2d 459, 478-79 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
156. See Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld, 555 F.2d 817, 825 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (amended decision) (NEPA purpose carried out by weighing of environmental
costs against technical, economic and strategic benefits of each alternative). See also
Columbia Basin Land Protection Ass'n v. Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585, 594 (9th Cir.
1981) ("The balancing of the environmental costs of a project against its economic
and technological benefits is mandated by NEPA.").
157. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 685 F.2d 459, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
158. Izaak Walton League of America v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346, 365 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (Army Corps of Engineers adequately fulfilled NEPA obligations by filing
sufficient EIS for a proposed lock and dam for Upper Mississippi River Navigation
System).
159. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b) (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1976).
160. 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1 (1982). These agencies have jurisdiction by law or special
expertise on any environmental impacts involved or in areas of environmental con-
cerns regarding the proposing agency's Draft EIS (DEIS). Comments must be solic-
ited after preparation of a DEIS and before preparation of a Final EIS (FEIS). Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. § 1503.4(a). If the changes in response to comments are relatively minor,
the agency need not rewrite the draft, but should attach the changes to the state-
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Public meetings to discuss the impact statements are not required
by the CEQ. Yet, a court reviewing the adequacy of the EIS proce-
dures may order such a meeting if an agency has it own public
meeting regulations and has failed to comply with them. 16 4 Moreover,
should an agency decide to hold a NEPA-related meeting or hearing,
the agency must publicly notify persons and agencies who may be
affected by the proposed action. 6 5
V. Standing
Private individuals may bring suit under NEPA for an agency's
failure to file an EIS. 66 In Sierra Club v. Morton,16 7 the Supreme
Court permitted individuals to seek review of agency conduct under
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),'68 by showing that they
sustained injury in fact. 69 Moreover, the Court ruled that having
supplied the requisite independent basis for standing, individuals also
could assert the interests of the general public.17 0
Lower courts have extended Morton to NEPA cases to permit a
party challenging the sufficiency of an EIS to assert the promotion of
the welfare of society, provided that the party has an independent
basis to bring the suit. 17 An independent basis, injury in fact, was
established in Sierra Club v. Adams. 7 2 In Adams, the plaintiffs sought
to enjoin American participation in constructing the Darien Gap
Highway in Panama and Columbia because of deficiencies in the
EIS.173 The District of Columbia Circuit agreed that because the
ment, which will be filed later as the final statement. All substantive comments must
be attached to the FEIS. Id. § 1503.4(b), (c).
See also California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 773 (9th Cir. 1982). In Block, the court
found an EIS inadequate on grounds that the Forest Service had neither identified
nor discussed "responsible opposing viewpoints" concerning site allocations of road-
less national forest system land. Id. The court declared that "NEPA's public comment
procedures are at the heart of the NEPA review process. NEPA requires responsible
opposing viewpoints to be included in the final EIS." Id. at 770. See also 42 U.S.C. §
4332(2)(C) (1976).
164. Izaak Walton League of America v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346, 364 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
165. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6(b) (1982).
166. See notes 167-74 infra and accompanying text.
167. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
168. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See notes 181-82 infra and
accompanying text.
169. 405 U.S. at 735.
170. Id. at 740 n.15.
171. See notes 172-74 infra and accompanying text.
172. 578 F.2d 389, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
173. Id. at 390.
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Sierra Club had standing to challenge the impact statement on the
ground of injury in fact, the Sierra Club was permitted to raise "other
inadequacies in the [Final EIS] based upon the 'public interest' in
requiring government officials to discharge faithfully their statutory
duties under NEPA."1 74
VI. Judicial Review
A. Standard of Review
In general, courts have been reluctant to interfere with agency
decision making, a reluctance which may stem in part from a desire
not to disrupt the constitutional balance of power. Prior to NEPA's
enactment, courts did not review agency actions that threatened envi-
ronmental damage, 175 preferring to leave agency decisions entirely to
agency discretion. However, in Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Commit-
174. Id. at 392. The court ultimately vacated the district court's injunction upon a
finding that the EIS adequately discussed the information a decision maker would
need to balance properly the environmental factors of a decision. Id. at 395. More-
over, the discussion of alternatives satisfied a rule of reason. Id.
See California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 776 (9th Cir. 1982) (party alleging NEPA
violation must show both "injury in fact" and that the interests sought to be protected
are "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute
or constitutional guarantee in question"); Save the Bay, Inc. v. United States Corps
of Eng'rs, 610 F.2d 322, 325 (5th Cir. 1980) ("An allegation of residence coupled
with an allegation of injury caused by federal action affecting the area of that
residence clearly demonstrates that the party seeking review is among those in-
jured."). Cf. Noe v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 644 F.2d 434, 438
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1126 (1981). In Noe, the court refused to give an
individual a right of action against MARTA for failing to comply with the informa-
tion contained in the EIS which MARTA had filed. Noe is clearly distinguishable
from other private right of action cases in which individuals sue to compel an agency
to file an EIS.
Closely related to the standing question is whether a party must exhaust adminis-
trative remedies lrior to filing suit in a district court. In Susquehanna Valley Alliance
v. Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor, 619 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1096 (1981), the Third Circuit answered the question in the affirmative. Be-
cause the judge made rule of exhaustion cannot affect or impair the subject matter
jurisdiction of the federal judiciary, reasoned the court, the party wishing to compel
agency compliance with NEPA need not exhaust administrative remedies prior to
seeking relief from federal courts. Id. at 241, 245.
Of course, the burden of proving that an agency has failed to comply with NEPA is
on the plaintiffs. See Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Educ. Project,
454 U.S. 139, 142 (1981) (plaintiffs failed to show that preparation of an impact
statement by the Navy was required); Izaak Walton League of America v. Marsh,
655 F.2d 346, 377 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (plaintiffs did not successfully attack the Army
Corps of Engineers' conclusion that the physical impacts of an Upper Mississippi
River Navigation System project were minor).
175. See generally Comment, supra note 23.
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tee, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Commission, 76 one of the
earliest NEPA cases, the District of Columbia Circuit declared that
courts have the power to require agencies to comply with NEPA's
procedural directions. 77
Although agencies have considerable discretion to determine
whether to prepare and file an EIS, 178 a court may review the reason-
ableness of that decision. Similarly, if an agency does file an EIS, a
court may make a "pragmatic judgment"'' 9 concerning the suffi-
ciency of the EIS to foster "both informed decision-making and in-
formed public participation." 80
The standard of review is quite narrow. An agency decision
whether to prepare an EIS and what information to include falls
under the aegis of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).ls  The
APA provides that agency action may be overruled by a court only if
the agency action was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or
otherwise not in accordance with law." 82 Additionally, under NEPA,
the court must inquire whether the agency followed a "rule of rea-
son." 183
The reasonableness of agency action is decided on a case-by-case
basis. Once a court is satisfied that an agency has taken a "hard look"
176. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In Calvert Cliffs, the court was confronted
with Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) rules which did not comply with NEPA.
Because NEPA's procedural rules are not flexible and must therefore be complied
with to the fullest extent possible absent a clear conflict of statutory authority, the
court ordered the AEC to bring its rules into compliance with NEPA. Id. at 1115,
1129.
177. Id. at 1112.
178. See notes 155-57 supra and accompanying text.
179. California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 761 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing Warm Springs
Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 565 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1977)).
180. California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 761. In Block, the court' found that the
EIS did not foster informed decision making and public participation and was
therefore inadequate. 690 F.2d at 773.
181. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1976). Sections 701-706 concern judicial review. The
APA is binding on all "authorities" of the United States Government except Congress,
federal courts, the governments of the territories or United States possessions, and the
government of the District of Columbia. Id. § 551(1)(A)-(D).
182. Id. § 706(2)(A). See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 414 (1971); California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 761 (9th Cir. 1982); Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 685 F.2d 459, 475
(D.C. Cir. 1982); Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677, 693 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc)
(all follow APA § 706 standard of review).
183. California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 761 (9th Cir. 1982); North Slope Borough
v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Save the Bay, Inc. v. United States
Corps of Eng'rs, 610 F.2d 322, 325 (5th Cir. 1980).
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at the environmental consequences, the review must end.184 Finally, a
reviewing court may not substitute its own judgment for that of an
agency. 185
B. Compliance with APA Mandates
A court must set aside agency action that violates the APA man-
dates. 88 In Grazing Fields Farm v. Goldschmidt,87 the First Circuit
184. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 231 (1980)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21
(1976)). See California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 761 (9th Cir. 1982); Cabinet Moun-
tain Wilderness/Scotchman's Peak Grizzly Bears v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678, 682
(D.C. Cir. 1982).
Strycker's Bay involved a dispute over a proposed low-income housing project to be
constructed on Manhattan's Upper West Side. In 1971, the Trinity School, housed in
a combination school/middle-income housing development, sued to enjoin the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the New York City
Planning Commission from commencing the projects. The plaintiffs claimed that
HUD had failed to comply with NEPA's requirement to include alternatives in an
EIS. The district court concluded that NEPA had not been violated. Trinity Episco-
pal School Corp. v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
The Second Circuit ordered HUD to prepare a statement of possible alternatives,
consequences, facts and reasons for and against the project. 523 F.2d 88, 94 (2d Cir.
1975). On remand, the district court again found no NEPA violations. 454 F. Supp.
204, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The Second Circuit vacated and remanded because HUD
had not given determinative weight to environmental factors resulting from place-
ment of low-income housing into a concentrated area. 590 F.2d 39, 45 (2d Cir.
1978). The Supreme Court reversed. 444 U.S. 223, 228.
185. Strycker's Bay, 444 U.S. at 227; Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978); Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
186. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (D) (1976). See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc.
v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414 (1971); California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 761 (9th Cir.
1982); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 685 F.2d 459, 477-78 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (impacts table was arbitrary and
capricious in failing to allow for consideration of uncertainties and health, socioeco-
nomic and cumulative effects); Aertsen v. Landrieu, 637 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1980)
(HUD's decision that action was not a major federal action significantly affecting
environment was not arbitrary and capricious).
187. 626 F.2d 1068 (1st Cir. 1980). In this case, the Massachusetts Department of
Public Works (DPW) planned to extend a highway in the Buzzards Bay area of Cape
Cod by traversing Grazing Fields Farm, a 900-acre tract including farmland, a
wildlife sanctuary and a riding school. The DPW prepared an addendum to the
original EIS but never incorporated the addendum into the statement. Id. at 1070.
The court decided that information found in an administrative record but not
incorporated in an EIS did not satisfy the EIS alternatives requirement. Id. at 1072.
The court explained that to allow an otherwise insufficient EIS to pass NEPA muster
in this case "would hamper the flow of information to the public by making more
difficult the endeavors of watchdogs who could reasonably be expected to publicize
the environmental issues present, and would tend to mute those most likely to
identify problems and criticize decisions." Id. at 1073-74.
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established a test for reviewing agency actions: (1) the court must
determine whether the agency action was arbitrary and capricious;
and (2) the court must assess the agency's compliance with NEPA's
procedural duties.' 88 The court also should assure itself that the agen-
cy's consideration of the environmental consequences of its actions
was made in good faith, 89 without judging "the balance struck by the
agency among competing concerns." °°
In general, agency action is deemed "in good faith," and therefore
not "arbitrary and capricious," if the decision was based on a consid-
eration of relevant factors' 91-that is, the significant environmental
risks. 9 2 Moreover, the decision must be supported by "substantial
evidence" of such considerations. 93 One court found that an agency
had satisfied the "substantial evidence" requirement by conducting a
thorough analysis of the proposed action and by taking specific mea-
sures, such as discussing cumulative effects and considering mitigation
measures to address the relevant environmental issues. 9 4 Courts also
must consider whether the agency action involved a clear error of
judgment. 9 5 Absent a showing of arbitrary action, courts will assume
188. Id. at 1072; 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (D) (1976).
189. 626 F.2d at 1072.
190. Id. (citing Strycker's Bay, 444 U.S. at 227). See Columbia Basin Land
Protection Ass'n v. Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585, 592 (9th Cir. 1981); Warm Springs
Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 565 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1977); Concerned About
Trident v. Rumsfeld, 555 F.2d 817, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (amended decision).
191. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
See also Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regula-
tory Comm'n, 685 F.2d 459, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (relevant factors include "signifi-
cant environmental risks-probabilities or possibilities of environmental damage").
In addition, agencies must balance environmental costs of a project against its
economic and technological benefits. Columbia Basin Land Protection Ass'n v. Schle-
singer, 643 F.2d 585, 594 (9th Cir. 1981); 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B) (1976).
192. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 685 F.2d 459, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In this case, the significant environ-
mental risks were that toxic wastes from a nuclear power reactor would emit "radio-
logical effluents" into the atmosphere. Id. at 466-67.
193. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414 (1971).
See also Save the Bay, Inc. v. United States Corps of Eng'rs, 610 F.2d 322, 323 (5th
Cir. 1980) (where Environmental Assessment was reasonable and based on substan-
tial envidence, Corps not required to prepare EIS).
194. Cabinet Mountains Wilderness/Scotchman's Peak Grizzly Bears v. Peterson,
685 F.2d 678, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
195. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
Overton Park concerned the authorization of funds to finance construction of a
proposed highway through a public park. The highway would sever the zoo from the
rest of the park. The Supreme Court reversed a grant of summary judgment for the
Secretary of Transportation and ordered a stay of proceedings until the Secretary
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that an agency acted within its discretion. 96 Thus, the burden of
proving that an agency acted arbitrarily weighs heavily upon the
party asserting a NEPA violation. 9 7
The limits on judicial interference with the agency decision making
process were enunciated by the Supreme Court in Kleppe v. Sierra
Club."8 The judiciary has no authority, declared the Court, to disre-
gard statutory language and balance "court-devised factors" 9 to de-
termine when in the proposal's "germination process" an EIS should
be prepared. 20 0 The Court expressed concern that such an assertion of
judicial authority would confuse agencies about their procedural du-
ties under NEPA and invite both litigation and excessive judicial
involvement in agency decision making processes. 20 1
C. Review of EIS Compliance with NEPA
Once an EIS has been prepared, courts will compare it with the
procedural mandates of NEPA. 20 2 In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
exhausted planning to minimize harm to the park. Id. at 405-06. See also Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 685 F.2d 459, 480
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (agency's finding that nuclear wastes sealed in a repository would
have no environmental impact and therefore would pose no significant risk of envi-
ronmental damage was clear error of judgment).
196. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412 (1976). See also Save the Bay, Inc.
v. United States Corps of Eng'rs, 610 F.2d 322, 325 (5th Cir. 1980) (determination
must be upheld if it is reasonable and made objectively in good faith on reviewable
environmental record).
197. See Richland Park Homeowners Ass'n v. Pierce, 671 F.2d 935, 945 (5th Cir.
1982) (injunction denied because plaintiffs failed to prove HUD's decision not to file
an EIS was in bad faith).
198. 427 U.S. 390 (1976). In Kleppe, the Sierra Club sought an injunction compel-
ling the Department of the Interior and other federal agencies to prepare an EIS
before taking further steps to develop federal coal reserves in the Northern Great
Plains Region. Id. at 395-96. The Court decided that because there was no proposed
major federal action involved, grounds for an injunction did not exist. Id. at 399.
199. Id. at 406.
200. Id. The Court also demonstrated its reluctance to uphold lower court deci-
sions based on judicial creations in Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace
Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 141 (1981). In that case, the Ninth Circuit had required
the Navy to release a "hypothetical EIS" to the public. Catholic Action of Hawaii/
Peace Educ. Project v. Brown, 643 F.2d 569, 572 (9th Cir. 1980). The
Supreme Court reversed, declaring that the "hypothetical EIS" is "a creature of
judicial cloth... , not legislative cloth, . . . [and] is not mandated by any of the
statutory or regulatory provisions upon which the Court of Appeals relied." Id.
201. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 406 (1976).
202. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976). Section 102 of NEPA is now codified in § 4332,
which requires, in relevant part, that:
(2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall- . .
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legisla-
tion and other major Federal Actions significantly affecting the quality of
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Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,203 the Supreme
Court asserted that a reviewing court may not overturn an agency's
decision if the agency "employed at least the statutory minima. 20 4
The statutory minima require, inter alia, that the EIS contain a
"'reasonably thorough discussion of the significant aspects of the
probable environmental consequences'-205 and alternatives. 20 6 The
reviewing court must find that the alternatives selected and discussed
in the EIS foster "informed decision-making and informed public
participation";2 0 7 otherwise, the EIS will be deemed insufficient. 20
the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official
on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should
the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environ-
ment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity,
and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented....
(E) study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recom-
mended courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved con-
flicts concerning alternative uses of available resources; ...
(G) make available to States, counties, municipalities, institutions, and
individuals, advice and information useful in restoring, maintaining, and
enhancing the quality of the environment; ....
203. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
204. Id. at 548. In Vermont Yankee, the Court decided that the Atomic Energy
Commission had employed the statutory minima concerning an EIS upon which the
Commission granted construction permits to utilities seeking to construct and operate
nuclear power plants. Id. See also Piedmont Heights Civic Club v. Moreland, 637
F.2d 430, 44] (5th Cir. 1981) (failure to discuss all cumulative effects of highway
projects in an EIS did not result in a NEPA violation).
205. California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 761 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting Trout Unlim-
ited, Inc. v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1283 (9th Cir. 1974)). NEPA, after all, was
designed to insure "that federal agencies are fully aware of the present and future
environmental impact of their decisions." Columbia Basin Land Protection Ass'n v.
Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585, 592 (9th Cir. 1981).
206. See Grazing Fields Farm v. Goldschmidt, 626 F.2d 1068, 1072 (1st Cir.
-1980) (information found in an administrative record but not incorporated in an EIS
did not satisfy alternatives requirement); Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld, 555
F.2d 817, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (amended decision) (EIS deficient by failing to
mention the environmental aspects of alternatives).
207. California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 767 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing Save Lake
Washington v. Frank, 641 F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th Cir. 1981)) (injunction denied
because EIS adequately addressed the navigational risks associated with the proposed
site of docking facilities).
208. California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 769 (9th Cir. 1982) (unreasonable for the
Forest Service to overlook an obvious alternative).
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D. Review of the Reasonableness of an Agency Decision
Courts will review the reasonableness of an agency's decision con-
cerning an EIS. 20 9 For example, in Save the Bay, Inc. v. United States
Corps of Engineers,210 the Fifth Circuit upheld the Corps' decision not
to prepare an EIS for the construction of an outfall pipeline from a
manufacturing plant, finding that the decision was reasonable.2 1' The
Corps had followed advice from the proper agencies that no signifi-
cant impacts would result, and had reached the same conclusion
independently. 21 2 Thus, the court decided that the Corps had com-
plied with NEPA, had carefully assessed the situation, and had made
a reasonable decision. 213
Another illustration of reasonable agency action is found in Cabinet
Mountains Wilderness/Scotchman's Peak Grizzly Bears v. Peterson, 2 1 4
a recent District of Columbia Circuit decision. That case involved a
Forest Service decision to conduct exploratory mineral drilling which
might adversely affect the grizzly bear population. 215 The record indi-
cated that the agency had considered the proposal carefully, 21 had
been well informed about the likely problems, 2 7 and had "weighed
209. See Adler v. Lewis, 675 F.2d 1055, 1091 (9th Cir. 1982) (court reviewed
agency action under Overton Park standard and decided Secretary's determination
could be said to be within the small scope of alternatives and Secretary rationally
believed that there were no reasonable alternatives); North Slope Borough v. Andrus,
642 F.2d 589, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (court held agency to "reasonable consideration"
of all significant impacts and found that the discussion of impacts satisfied a "rule of
reason"); County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1375 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978) (standard of review was what is reasonable
under the circumstances).
210. 610 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1980).
211. Id. at 325.
212. Id. at 325-26.
213. Id.
214. 685 F.2d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
215. Id. at 680.
216. The agency had prepared an Environmental Assessment and conducted an
"extensive biological evaluation." Id. at 683.
217. The biological evaluation revealed that the bears could be affected in two
ways: (1) habitat modification, and (2) increased human/bear interactions. The
evaluation determined that there would be no significant adverse effect on the
habitat. However, the increase in human-bear interaction would have a more sub-
stantial effect. The Forest Service made 14 mitigation recommendations to counter-
act the adverse impacts. Id. The Forest Service also considered the cumulative effects
of the drilling project and implemented mitigation measures. One of these measures
involved the curtailment of timber sales and the closing of roads to provide a secure
bear habitat. Id. at 684.
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the likely impacts." 2  Therefore, the court upheld an agency determi-
nation that an EIS was unnecessary.2 1 9
A court may, however, set aside an agency decision in certain
"narrow instances," as the Supreme Court declared in Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park Inc. v. Volpe, 2 0 where the agency action was
"'unwarranted by the facts' "22 1 and was therefore clearly unreasona-
ble. For example, in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission,222 the District of Col-
umbia Circuit set aside an agency finding that a project to seal nuclear
wastes in a repository would have no environmental effect and there-
fore would pose no environmental risks.2 2 3 The court concluded that
the finding constituted a " 'clear error in judgment.' "224
Some jurisdictions have established criteria for determining
whether an agency followed a "rule of reason." The District of Col-
umbia, for example, will look at whether the agency: (1) took a "hard
look" at the problem; (2) identified the relevant areas of concern; (3)
presented a convincing case that the impacts were insignificant; and
(4) established convincingly that changes in the project sufficiently
reduced the significant impacts to a minimum. 225 The Ninth Circuit
recently set out relevant factors that an agency should consider in an
EIS or Environmental Assessment (EA) in a case involving a Forest
Service decision to allocate national forest land. 226 Some of these
factors were "Forest Service resource planning goals, wilderness at-
tributes, public accessibility to wilderness areas, public comment and
the economic effects of Wilderness classification. 22 7
218. Id. at 683.
219. Id.
220. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
221. Id. at 414. In these circumstances, a court would review the agency action de
novo. See also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976): "The reviewing
court shall . . . (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclu-
sions found to be . . . (F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are
subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court."
222. 685 F.2d 459 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
223. Id. at 480.
224. Id. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416
(1971).
225. Cabinet Mountains Wilderness, 685 F.2d at 682 (citing Maryland-National
Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. United States Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029, 1040
(D.C. Cir. 1973)).
226. California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982). The EIS failed to include
an obvious alternative, discuss or identify opposing viewpoints, or foster informed
decision making and public participation. The court found that the EIS was unrea-
sonable. Id. at 767-74.
227. Id. at 758.
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Absent a substantial procedural or substantive reason mandated by
statute,22 8 an agency decision must be upheld even if the court disap-
proves of the result. 229 A reviewing court may not attempt to resolve
conflicting scientific opinions.2 30 As the Second Circuit declared,
" '[t]he district court does not sit as a super-agency empowered to
substitute its scientific expertise on testimony presented to it de novo
for the evidence received and considered by the agency which pre-
pared the EIS.' "231
E. May an Injunction be Granted?
Once a court has decided that an action violates NEPA, an injun-
tion may be appropriate to curtail that action until the agency com-
piles with the Act. 23 2 An injunction will not be issued, however, until
a court has analyzed carefully the violations which have occurred,
possibilities for relief and "any countervailing societal interests that
might be adversely affected by . . . an injunction. ' 233 The party
228. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
229. Id. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223,
227 (1980) (NEPA designed to insure a fully informed decision but not necessarily the
decision that the court would make if it were a member of the decision making
committee); Adler v. Lewis, 675 F.2d 1085, 1094 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Even if the
decision of the Secretary be different from the one this court would make if it were
our responsibility to choose, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the
Secretary."); Citizens for Balanced Env't & Transp., Inc. v. Volpe, 650 F.2d 455,
462 (2d Cir. 1981) (court may not act as a decision maker "in the guise of securing
procedural compliance").
In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978), the Supreme Court ruled that agency decisions may
not be set aside "simply because the court is unhappy with the result reached." See
also Izaak Walton League of America v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346, 371 n.67 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (reviewing court may not substitute its own judgment as long as agency
decision not arbitrary and capricious); notes 184-85 supra and accompanying text.
230. Izaak Walton League of America v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346, 372 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (citing County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1383 (2d
Cir. 1977)).
231. Citizens for Balanced Env't & Transp., Inc. v. Volpe, 650 F.2d 455, 462 (2d
Cir. 1981) (quoting County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368,
1383 (2d Cir. 1977)).
232. Richland Park Homeowners Ass'n v. Pierce, 671 F.2d 935, 945 (5th Cir.
1982) (injunction not ordered because plaintiffs failed to prove HUD violated
NEPA); Realty Income Trust v. Eckerd, 564 F.2d 447, 458 (D.C Cir. 1977) (injunc-
tion not ordered because alleged NEPA violation was lack of timeliness and therefore
not serious enough to warrant injunction). See generally W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 798-809 (1977).
233. Richland Park Homeowners Ass'n v. Pierce, 671 F.2d 935, 942 (5th Cir.
1982) (injunction denied because injury to public interest outweighed the need for
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alleging a NEPA violation must show that the agency blatantly vio-
lated NEPA 234 and that irreparable harm will ensue if the injunction
is denied, 235 a heavy burden of proof. A court should "tailor its relief
to fit each particular case 2 36 by balancing NEPA's environmental
concerns against interests of society that might be affected adversely
by an injunction. 237 A court may not issue an injunction under NEPA
as a prophylactic or punitive measure. 238 However, a court may issue
an injunction even when a project is in an advanced stage of comple-
tion, if the court finds that an agency has blatantly violated NEPA's
procedural requirements.239
injunctive relief). See also Environmental Defense Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983,
1005-06 (5th Cir. 1981) (court found Army Corps of Engineers blatantly violated
NEPA and enjoined construction of Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway until Corps
prepared and filed SEIS).
234. See Richland Park Homeowners Ass'n v. Pierce, 671 F.2d 935, 942 (5th Cir.
1982) In this case, the plaintiffs failed to show that HUD had acted in bad faith by
not filing an EIS when providing federal financial assistance for constructing and
operating a Dallas low-income apartment project. As the court noted, the factual
showing was "open to the interpretation that the homeowners represented by the
plaintiffs mostly oppose[d] the project because they fear[ed] that the low-income
residents of the project [would] cause a material degradation of their neighborhood
,environment.' " Id. at 938.
The plaintiffs also had the burden of proving that the value of the injunction
would greatly outweigh the adversely affected public interests. Id. at 942. The court
found that the injury to the public interest caused by the uprooting of low-income
families from their homes and the "lack of environmental relief that would result
from their eviction" were factors weighing heavily against the demand for an injunc-
tion. Id. at 943. Moreover, the NEPA violations were minor. Id. at 945. Thus, an
injunction that would prevent the payment of rent subsidies to low-income families
was inappropriate under the circumstances. Id.
235. Environmental Defense Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983, 1006 (5th Cir. 1981)
(major changes in project could have significant environmental impacts).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Realty Income Trust v. Eckerd, 564 F.2d 447, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (citing
Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786, 799 n. 12 (9th Cir. 1975)) (injunction denied because
EIS adequate except for lack of timeliness).
239. Environmental Defense Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983, 1006 (5th Cir. 1981)
(court enjoined project which was 55 % completed). See Richland Park Homeowners
Ass'n v. Pierce, 671 F.2d 935, 942 (5th Cir. 1982) (project in post-completion stage
not enjoined because of failure to show that HUD acted in bad faith or that public
interest would be irreparably harmed). See also TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978)
(the Tellico Dam case). In TVA v. Hill, the Supreme Court enjoined a project which
was 80% completed where continuation of the project would have violated the
Endangered Species Act (ESA), the purpose of which, according to the Court, was to
"halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost." Id. at 184.
The Court stated that an injunction was the proper remedy for a violation of the
ESA. Id. at 172. While the case did not concern NEPA, an analogy may be drawn,
and it would appear that an obvious NEPA violation should be similarly enjoined.
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VII. Westway
The recent "Westway '' 240 litigation involves the two major NEPA
issues: compliance with NEPA procedures and the extent of judicial
review under the Act. The principal issue in Sierra Club v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers241 ("Westway II") was whether the
Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) had fulfilled its obligation under
NEPA by relying on an EIS issued in 1977 by the Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA) and the New York State Department of
Transportation (NYSDOT) .242 The issue on appeal ("Westway III and
IV") 2 4 3 was whether the district court was justified in interfering with
the agencies' decision making processes by enjoining the project when
the court found that the Corps had failed to fulfill its NEPA obliga-
tions.244
In "Westway II," the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York decided that the 1977 EIS was inadequate. 245
Another analogous situation occurred in Weinberger v. Carlus-Romero-Barcelo,
50 U.S.L.W. 4434 (U.S. Apr. 27, 1982), in which the Court decided that ordering an
injunction for a violation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 86
Stat. 816 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976)) was not an abuse of judicial
discretion. The FWPCA, stated the Court, permits a court to order the relief it deems
necessary to comply with the Act. Such relief may include an order of immediate
cessation. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4437.
240. Westway is a proposed 4.2 mile six lane interstate highway link to be con-
structed on the West Side of Manhattan between the Brooklyn-Battery Tunnel and
42nd Street. A landfill in the Hudson River was proposed to create 234 acres of land
for highway ramps, new development and recreational parks. Most of the highway
will be underground. According to the recent FHWA estimates, Westway will cost
$1.8 billion, $1.4 billion of which is eligible for federal funding. 1982 COMPTROLLER
GEN. TRISTATE GEN. REGIONAL PLAN. COMM'N, APPROVAL OF THE WESTWAY HIGH-
WAY PROJECT, NEW YORK CITY [hereinafter cited as GAO REPORT]. See also Sierra
Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 82-6125 (2d Cir. Feb. 25, 1983)
("Westway IV'); Sierra Club v. Hennessy, No. 82-6175 (2d Cir. Dec. 6, 1982)
("Westway III").
241. 541 F. Supp. 1367 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
242. This issue was decided in March, 1982, Sierra Club v. United States Army
Corps of Eng'rs, No. 81 Civ. 3000 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 1982) ("Westway I"), and in
June, 1982, Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 541 F. Supp. 1367
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("Westway II"). In both opinions, Judge Griesa found that the
Corps should not have relied on the 1977 EIS, but rather should have prepared a
SEIS disclosing new information. See 541 F. Supp. at 1369.
243. "Westway IV," No. 82-6125 (2d Cir. Feb. 25, 1983); "Westway III," No. 82-
6175 (2d Cir. Dec. 6, 1982).
244. "Westway III," slip op. at 616.
245. "Westway II," 541 F. Supp. at 1370. See also GAO REPORT, supra note 240
(description of the Westway project). In 1975, the project was approved by the Tri-
State Regional Planning Commission, a metropolitan planning organization and an
areawide clearinghouse required by the Office of Management and Budget. Tri-State
is responsible for developing a coordinated regional transportation plan and pro-
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Following approval of the EIS and before major funding was re-
ceived, new information concerning the environmental impacts of the
project had become available. 246 The most significant information
included: a fishery study ("LMS study") revealing that the proposed
landfill site is an important overwintering habitat for striped bass; and
comments submitted by the National Marine Fishery Service (NMFS),
the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA), indicating that the proposed landfill was likely to
have a serious adverse impact on Hudson River fisheries. 247 The
gram, and deals with comments on proposed federally funded projects. GAO RE-
PORT, supra note 240, at i.
The legal controversy centers around an EIS prepared by the NYSDOT and
approved by the FHWA in 1977. The Secretary of Transportation approved
Westway for federal funding in Jan., 1977. Id. at ii. According to NEPA, where a
federal action involves a grant of funds to a state, the EIS may be prepared by a state
agency so long as the responsible federal official insures that the EIS scope, objectiv-
ity and content are proper. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(D) (1976).
The question of the validity of the 1977 EIS has been litigated several times. Action
for Rational Transit v. West Side Highway, 536 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
("ART II") involved two suits against the Westway project. The first, brought by
ART, alleged violations of both NEPA and the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-
7642 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). ART asserted that because of the air pollution
problems which would be caused by Westway, the project should be enjoined.
Moreover, preference for an alternative and less expensive highway, coupled with a
trade-in of the excess funds for mass transit improvement was stressed. The claim was
dismissed. "ART II," 536 F. Supp. at 1254. However, the court ordered a further
hearing to determine whether to issue an injunction against the Secretary of Trans-
portation to prevent funding for Westway because the Department of Transportation
failed to comply with NEPA regarding the adverse environmental effects on fisheries.
Id.
The second suit, brought by the Sierra Club, alleged that the Army Corps of
Engineers had violated NEPA by relying on the 1977 EIS which failed to reveal that
the proposed landfill was an important habitat for juvenile striped bass. Id. at 1229.
The court found that the Corps had failed to make any effort of its own to corrobo-
rate the information in the EIS and violated its NEPA obligations by failing to
disclose to the public the significant adverse environmental impact of the landfill.
The court issued a preliminary injunction, setting aside the permit for the landfill.
Id. at 1253-54.
See also Action for Rational Transit v. West Side Highway, 517 F. Supp. 1342
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("ART I") (motion for preliminary injunction denied because peti-
tioners failed to show either irreparable harm or a balance of hardships tipped in
their favor).
246. "Westway II," 541 F. Supp. at 1369.
247. Id. at 1369-70. Additional new information included: (1) proposals for sev-
eral new alternatives to the project were made; (2) the urban development aspects of
the project were rendered less attractive and important because of urban renewal in
the West Side area; (3) the project costs were increased and adequate funding
became less certain; (4) the estimated levels of pollution resulting from construction
and operation of the project rose. Id. However, the court in "Westway II" found that
the plaintiffs had not proven the need for supplementation as to items (1)-(4) above.
Id. at 1370.
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FHWA did not supplement the 1977 EIS with this new informa-
tion.2 48 Moreover, in October 1980, the FWHA and the NYSDOT
informed the Corps, the agency responsible for granting the landfill
permit, that no significant new information had been released.2 49 In
November 1980, the Division Engineer recommended issuance of the
landfill permit. 250
In an action instituted by the Sierra Club and other concerned
groups, 25' the district court held that: (1) the 1977 EIS was inadequate
248. Id. The court found that the 1977 EIS was insufficient even before the new
fishery study. Id. at 1371. The EIS asserted that the interpier area (the proposed site
for the landfill) was a "biological wasteland," Brief for Respondent at 8, Sierra Club
v. Hennessy, No. 82-6175 (2d Cir. Dec. 6, 1982), a statement made on the basis of a
1974 sampling. The NMFS, in its comment in response to the 1974 Draft EIS, stated
that the sampling information was insufficient to evaluate the impacts because the
sampling had taken place in the summer when fish could not have been present
because of low oxygen levels in the water. Brief for Respondent at 9-10, "Westway
II," 541 F. Supp. at 1372. The court concluded that "those responsible for preparing
the fishery material in the January 1977 EIS knew, or should have known, of the lack
of factual basis for what was stated." 541 F. Supp. at 1372.
249. Brief for Respondent at 21.
250. Id. at 21-22. The NMFS then conducted its own study of the project and
submitted alternative proposals which would provide an adequate replacement high-
way without landfilling. Id. at 24. Moreover, this alternative highway would be less
expensive than Westway and the leftover funds might be traded in for mass transit
improvement. Id.
Much of the opposition to the Westway project involves this alternative of "trading
in" the Westway funds. See GAO REPORT, supra note 240, at iii. These funds must be
traded in by September 1983. See Letter from N.Y. Congressmen and State Senators
to Governor Carey (July 19, 1982). Congressman Ted Weiss (D-N.Y.), a leading anti-
Westway proponent, has mentioned that a "less grandiose" highway would "not
exacerbate existing traffic problems, . . . pose environmental hazards and . . . dis-
rupt the West Side for the next decade or so." Statement of Congressman Ted Weiss
at the Westway/Trade-in Press Conference, in New York City (July 19, 1982).
Congressman Weiss has stressed the need for funds for mass transit improvements.
"Any responsible government," claimed Congressman Weiss, "offered the choice of
rejuvenating a suffering mass transit system or wasting billions on an ill-conceived,
pie-in-the-sky highway, would choose to help mass transit." Id. In addition to
desiring a trade-in, anti-Westway advocates have expressed concern over the $352
million gap between federal and state estimates of Westway's total cost. Cong. Ted
Weiss News, Nov. 17, 1981.
On the other side, there is some concern that the trade-in will be futile. The
already collapsed lower portion of the West Side Highway must be replaced, as must
the existing upper portion of the West Side Highway. The trade-in funds may not
cover the expenses, particularly because federal trade-in funds have a budget of $550
million for 1983 and already twenty-five states and localities are requesting trade-ins
totalling nearly $6 billion. N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1982, at A30, col.l.
251. The other plaintiffs are: The City Club of New York, Business for Mass
Transit, Committee for Better Transit, Inc., N.Y.C. Clean Air Campaign, Inc.,
West 12th Street Block Association, Hudson River Fisherman's Association, Hudson
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because the contents had no factual basis;2 52 (2) the EIS should have
been supplemented when data from the new fishery study became
available; 253 and (3) the failure of the responsible agencies, most
notably the FHWA, to file a SEIS was unreasonable and in bad
faith. 25 4 The FHWA failed to comply with NEPA, and compliance
"was and is a predicate for any lawful action . . . in approving. . . or
providing funding for Westway." 255 The court voided actions taken
by the FHWA in approving the design and location of and funding for
Westway and remanded the matter to the FHWA, ostensibly to pre-
pare a SEIS.2 56 In addition, the court issued a final injunction prevent-
ing federal reimbursement for the landfill right-of-way acquisition.2 57
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's perma-
nent injunction against the reimbursement of the landfill acquisition
under the Rivers and Harbors Act ("Westway 111").258 In reversing,
the Second Circuit decided that the plaintiffs would not be harmed
irreparably by the commitment of federal funds for the right-of-
way. 25 '9 The court ruled that the district court had erred further by
failing to weigh the adverse effects of the injunction on New York
County Citizens for Clean Air, Seymour Durst, Otis Burger, Mary Rowe, and
Howard Singer.
252. "Westway II," 541 F. Supp. at 1371.
253. Id. at 1381.
254. Id. The court concluded that the FHWA and "the Project" failed to issue a
SEIS "not because the new fisheries information was insignificant, but because the
information revealed a highly significant environmental impact which they wished
to avoid disclosing." Id. Moreover, the court stated that the FHWA, "in collabora-
tion with the New York State DOT, acted in willful derogation of the requirements
of law in failing to issue a corrective supplemental environmental impact statement.
The FHWA fully recognized the serious nature of the environmental impact which
had been revealed by the new fisheries data, but refrained from making the required
public disclosure." Id. at 1383.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. As the court emphatically stated, "the paramount consideration is that
the FHWA and the State have failed to fulfill the conditions of federal law necessary
to enable the FHWA to provide, and the State to receive, federal funding." Id. This
final injunction was issued under the Clean Water Act and Rivers and Harbors Act of
1899. This injunction was reversed by the Second Circuit. Sierra Club v. Hennessy,
No. 82-6175, slip op. at 622 (2d Cir. Dec. 6, 1982). However, the Second Circuit
ordered the Corps to file a supplemental EIS discussing the impacts of the project on
the fisheries. Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 82-6125, slip
op. at 2091 (2d Cir. Feb. 25, 1983).
258. "Westway III," No. 82-6175, slip op. at 622.
259. Id. at 617. The court reasoned that the FHWA's payment of funds is not
irrevocable because the state must refund the FHWA if Westway is not built or if the
land is not used for an alternative highway. Id. (citing 23 U.S.C. § 103(e)(7) (Supp.
1II 1980)).
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State and New York City,260 an egregious error in light of the court's
belief that such a weighing would show that the possible injuries to
the State and City far outweigh the potential benefits to the plain-
tiffs. 261
In a second opinion, ("Westway IV"),26 2 the Second Circuit upheld
the district court's finding that the Corps and the FHWA had violated
NEPA. 263 The EIS did not indicate that the agencies involved were
fully aware of the present and future environmental consequences of
their decision; on the contrary, the EIS omitted the most significant
environmental fact involving the fisheries. 26 4 Failure to inform the
public and the decision makers (the Corps) of this crucial fact was a
blatant violation of NEPA, particularly in light of the studies by
environmental agencies, both public and private. The district court,
therefore, was justified in enjoining the Westway project until the
agencies prepare a supplemental EIS containing "adequate and accu-
rate information with respect to the fisheries issues." 26 5 As the Second
260. "Westway III," No. 82-6175, slip op. at 620. The court expressed its belief
that where "public consequences" are implicated, a district court must "balance the
conveniences of the parties and possible injuries to them according (sic) as they may
be affected by the granting or withholding of the injunction." Id. at 622 (citing
Weinberger v. Carlus-Romero-Barcelo, 50 U.S.L.W. 4434, 4435 (U.S. Apr. 27,
1982); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944)).
261. "Westway III," No. 82-6175, slip op. at 622. The court noted that precluding
the NYSDOT from receiving 90% of the funds from the FHWA will have a strong
adverse impact on the State's fiscal policies. Id.
262. Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 82-6125 (2d Cir.
Feb. 25, 1983) ("Westway IV").
263. "Westway IV," slip op. at 2034. The court found further that the Corps
violated the Clean Water Act by relying on the FEIS that inadequately discussed the
issue of aquatic impact. Thus, both the landfill permit granted by the Corps and the
FEIS with respect to fisheries issues were invalidated. However, the court modified
the district court's order that a supplemental EIS include material relating to non-
fishery issues and vacated the district court's appointment of a special master to
oversee the preparation of the supplement. Finally, the Second Circuit overruled the
district court's prohibition against the FHWA and the Corps acting as joint lead
agencies in preparing the supplement, but upheld the requirement that the agencies
maintain records for judicial review of their final decision. Slip op. at 2027-28.
264. "Westway IV," slip op. at 2040. The court added that the agencies responsi-
ble for preparing the EIS had neither adequately compiled fisheries data, compiled
information in good faith, nor paid attention to experts' warnings that important
information was lacking. Thus, as the court concluded, the agencies
had reached the erroneous conclusion that the interpier area was a biologi-
cal wasteland. The baseless and erroneous factual conclusion then became
a false premise in the decision-makers' evaluations of the overall environ-
mental impact of Westway and their balancing of the expected benefits of
the proposed action against the risks of harm to the environment.
Id.
265. Id.
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Circuit noted, the 1977 EIS fisheries conclusions lacked a " 'substan-
tial basis in fact.' ",266 Thus, a decision maker relying on the EIS could
not make a fully informed decision about the environmental impacts
of the project. 267
The Second Circuit also found that the district court's rulings were
within the proper scope of its review power. 268 The district court had
found that the EIS contained false statements and an inadequate
compilation of relevant information-findings which permit a court
to invalidate an EIS. 269 Thus, the district court properly concluded
that the Corps and the FHWA had failed to live up to their NEPA
obligations, in light of the
cavalier manner in which the Project had reached its conclusion
that the interpier area was a biological wasteland, and ...
FHWA's failure to make an independent evaluation or to react in
any way to sister agencies' pointed comments that the draft EIS did
not provide adequate information for a reasoned assessment of
impact on fisheries. 27 °
VIII. Recommendations
Enacted to protect the environment, NEPA mandates the publi-
cation of the maximum amount of information, in an effort to obtain
the most well-informed decisions about the environmental impact of
proposed federal projects. Agencies failing to comply with NEPA run
the risk of litigation brought by private or public groups to force the
agencies to comply. This may be, however, too insignificant a risk for
so vital a requirement.
At the present time, as "Westway" demonstrates, a court, after
finding a blatant violation of NEPA, is limited to requiring an agency
to file a SEIS containing the proper information-information which
the Act mandates to begin with. Therefore, an agency runs little risk
by violating NEPA, while the public may assume a substantial risk.
266. Id. at 2034.
267. Id. Certainly, the district court's finding of harm to the plaintiffs was not
misguided; after all, once destroyed, the important fish habitat may not be repaired
or replaced. The proposed landfill presents the risks of "direct population losses" of
fish and adverse effects on the level of future fishery stocks in the Hudson River.
"Westway II," 541 F. Supp. at 1377. Although the agencies attempted to remedy the
problem by suggesting mitigation measures, the new fisheries data revealed that
these measures would "in no way provide the kind of habitat lost to the landfill, nor
would it offer substantial mitigation." Id. at 1376.
268. "Westway IV," slip op. at 2031. See notes 175-239 supra and accompanying
text.
269. "Westway IV," slip op. at 2031.
270. Id. at 2033-34.
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There is no assurance that the private sector will perceive a violation
or fund a court attack, even if the violation is detected. Moreover,
once the litigation process is undertaken by the private sector, it may
necessarily delay an otherwise worthwhile project. There also is the
danger that public funds will be misused in massive litigation and that
the project costs will rise because of the delay in obtaining agency
compliance. Both time and money would, at the very minimum, be
inefficiently utilized, if not wasted.
Agency compliance with NEPA is crucial, and to this end steps
should be taken to broaden the Act to compel compliance. In view of
the limitations on the powers of the courts to issue injunctions, as
"Westway" points out, an attempt to expand this judicial weapon is
hardly useful. An expansion of administrative power would be both
easier and more beneficial. One solution would be to create an om-
budsman-type agency with a "watch-dog" function. In the area of
environmental protection, such an agency already exists, the CEQ,
which interprets and enforces NEPA policies, but does not have the
power to halt or veto a project for non-compliance with NEPA. 271
Presently, the CEQ is limited to suggesting to the President that a
specific action should not be taken. 27 2
271. Under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7609 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), the
Environmental Protection Agency must review and comment publicly on the envi-
ronmental impacts of federal activities, including those for which EIS's are prepared.
If the EPA determines that the action is "unsatisfactory from the standpoint of public
health or welfare or environmental quality," the matter must be referred to the
CEQ. 40 C.F.R. § 1504.1(b) (1982).
Once the CEQ receives the referral, it may take one or more of the following
actions:
(1) Conclude that the process of referral and response has successfully
resolved the problem.
(2) Initiate discussions with the agencies with the objective of media-
tion with referring and lead agencies.
(3) Hold public meetings or hearings to obtain additional views and
information.
(4) Determine that the issue is not one of national importance and
request the referring and lead agencies to pursue their decision process.
(5) Determine that the issue should be further negotiated by the refer-
ring and lead agencies and is not appropriate for council consideration
until one or more heads of agencies report to the Council that the agencies'
disagreements are irreconcilable.
(6) Publish its findings and recommendations (including where appro-
priate a finding that the submitted evidence does not support the position
of an agency).
(7) When appropriate, submit the referral and the response together
with the Council's recommendations to the President for action.
Id. § 1504.3(f). See note 31 supra.
272. See note 271 supra.
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The power of the CEQ should be broadened to include the power to
veto a project; the CEQ would then effectively possess the injunctive
power which courts presently lack. As an ombudsman, the CEQ
would process all complaints from individuals or groups. All proposals
for major federal actions would be required to pass CEQ muster
before the action could be taken. Thus, the CEQ would become the
reviewing agency for all federal action encompassed by NEPA, with a
view toward minimizing non-compliance by agencies and thereby
reducing excessive litigation.
The exercise of the CEQ's powers should be reviewable in courts of
law. Agencies that are unhappy with the CEQ's decisions should be
permitted to seek judicial review of the CEQ action. In addition, the
already existing private right of action 273 to sue an agency for failure
to comply with NEPA should be expanded to include a right to sue the
CEQ for failure to police the non-complying agencies.
IX. Conclusion
In the last analysis, NEPA's purpose-to protect the environment-
should not be diluted by limiting the weapons to achieve agency
compliance with the EIS requirements. Courts, with their overloaded
dockets and limited expertise in environmental matters, should be the
last resort in the process to achieve NEPA compliance, not the only
one. An ombudsman type agency, such as a greatly expanded CEQ, is
eminently suited to fill a crucial gap in the existing process of environ-
mental protection.
Fran Hoffinger
273. See notes 166-74 supra and accompanying text.
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